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Hedging – Strategy @ Risk

Tag: Hedging

  • Simulation of balance sheet risk

    Simulation of balance sheet risk

    This entry is part 6 of 6 in the series Balance simulation

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    As I wrote in the article about balance sheet risk, a company with covenants in its loan agreements may have to hedge balance sheet risk even though it is not optimal from a market risk perspective.

    But how can the company know which covenant to hedge?  Often a company will have more than one covenant, and hedging one of them may adversely impact the other.  To answer the question it is necessary to calculate the effect of a hedge strategy, and the best way to do that is by using a simulation model.  Such a model can give the answer by estimating the probability of breech of a covenant.

    Which hedging strategy the company is to choose demands knowledge about what covenant is the most at risk.   How likely is it that the company will face a breech?  Like I described in the previous article:

    Which hedging strategy the company chooses depends on which covenant is most at risk.  There are inherent conflicts between the different hedging strategies, and therefore it is necessary to make a thorough assessment before implementing any such hedging strategy.

    In addition:

    If the company hedges gearing, the size of the equity will be more at risk [..], And in addition, drawing a larger proportion of debt in the home (or functional) currency may imply an increase in economic risk.  [..] Hence, if the company does not have to hedge gearing it should hedge its equity.

    To analyse the impact of different strategies and to answer the questions above I have included simulation of currency rates in the example from the previous article:

    simulation model balance sheet risk

    The result of strategy choice given a +/- 10% change in currency rates  was shown in the previous article.  But that model cannot give the answer to how likely it is that the company will face a breech situation.  How large changes in currency rates can the company take?

    To look at this issue I have used the following modeling of currency rates:

    • Rates at the last day of every quarter from 31/12/02 to 30/06/2013.  The reason for choosing these dates is of course that they are the dates when the balance sheet is measured.  It doesn’t matter if the currency rates are unproblematic March 1st if they are problematic March 31st.  Because that is the date when books are closed for Q1 and the date when the balance sheet is measured.
    • I have analysed the rated using Excel @Risk, which can fit a probability curve on historical rates.  There are, of course, many methods for estimating currency rates and I will get back to that later.  But this method has advantages; the basis is actual rates which have actually occurred.

    The closest fit to the data was a LapLace-curve ((RiskLaplace (μ,σ) specifies a laplace distribution with the entered μ location and σ scale parameters. The laplace distribution is sometimes called a “double exponential distribution” because it resembles two exponential distributions placed back to back, positioned with the entered location parameter.))  for EUR and a Uniform-curve ((RiskUniform(minimum,maximum) specifies a uniform probability distribution with the entered minimum and maximum values. Every value across the range of the uniform distribution has an equal likelihood of occurrence)) for USD against NOK.

    estimatkurverIt is always a good idea to ask yourself if the fitted result has a good story behind it.  Is it logical?  What we want is to find a good estimate for future currency rates.  If the logic is hard to see, we should go back and analyze more.  But there seems to be a good logic/story behind these estimates in my opinion:

    • EUR against NOK is so called mean reverting, meaning that it normally will revert back to a level of around 8 NOK +/- for 1 EUR.  Hence, the curve is pointed and has long tails.  We most likely will have to pay 8 NOK for 1 EUR, but it can move quite a bit away from the expected mean, both up and down.
    • USD is more unpredictable against NOK and a uniform curve, with any level of USD/NOK being as likely, sound like a good estimate.

    In addition to the probability curves for USD and EUR an estimate for the correlation between them is needed.  I used the same historical data to calculate historical correlation.  On the end quarter rates it has been 0,39.  A positive correlation means that the rates move the same way – if one goes up, so does the other.  The reason is that it was the NOK that moved against both currencies.  That’s also a good assessment, I believe. History has shown it to be the case.

    Now we have all the information needed to simulate how much at risk our (simple) balance sheet is to adverse currency movements.  And based on the simulation, the answer is: Quite a bit.

    I have modeled the following covenants:

    • Gearing < 1,5
    • Equity > 3 000

    This is the result of the simulation (click on the image to zoom):

    Simulation results

    Gearing is the covenant most at risk, as the tables/graphs show.  Both in the original mix (all debt in NOK) and if the company is hedging equity there is a high likelihood of breaching the gearing covenant.

    There is a probability of 22% in the first case (all debt in NOK) and a probability of 23% in the second (equity-hedge).  This is a rather high probability, considering that the NOK may move quite a bit, quit quickly.

    The equity is less at risk and the covenant has more headroom.  There is a 13% probability for breech with all debt in NOK, but 0% should the company choose either of the two hedging strategies.  This is due to the fact that currency loans will reduce risk, regardless of whether debt fully hedges assets, or only partially.

    Hence, based on this example it is easy to give advice to the company.  The company should hedge gearing by drawing debt in a mix of currencies reflecting its assets.  Reality is of course more complex than this example, but the mechanism will be the same.  And the need for accurate decision criteria – likelihood of breech – is more important the more complex the business is.

    debtOne thing that complicates the picture is the impact different strategies have on the company’s debt.  Debt levels may vary substantially, depending on choice of strategy.

    If the company has to refinance some of its debt, and at the same time there is a negative impact on the value of the debt (weaker home currency), the refinancing need will be substantially higher than what would have been the case with local debt. This is also answers you can get from the simulation modeling.

    The answer to the questions: “How likely is it that the company to breech its covenants and what are the consequences of strategic choices on key figures, debt and equity?” is something really only a good simulation model can give.

    Originally published in Norwegian.

  • Hedging the balance sheet

    Hedging the balance sheet

    This entry is part 5 of 6 in the series Balance simulation

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    A hedging strategy should be oriented towards hedging the company’s market value to build shareholder value.  Normally hedging of balance sheet items is not a good argument for hedging from the shareholders point of view, since a company’s balance sheet not necessarily reflect its market value.

    In some cases, however, it may be argued that hedging the balance sheet creates shareholder value, since a lack of hedging may lead to the company breeching covenants in loan agreements.  The cost for the shareholders in that case is, as a minimum, increased cost in the form of higher margins on debt.  Ultimately, it may mean that the company is technically bankrupt and that the share capital is lost, in which case the shareholders values are lost.  Therefore, implicitly this is a hedging strategy which is necessary from the shareholders point of view.

    Theoretically it may also be claimed that companies should not hedge at all, as the shareholders may achieve the wanted level of risk by diversifying their portfolios.  But in the case of balance sheet risk this is not possible.  Since the risk is in the books of the company, it is only in the company the risk may be hedged and have the desired impact on the bankruptcy risk of the company.  This is therefore a special case compared to many other risks.

    Covenants in loan agreements may warrant hedging to avoid breech solely because of changes in currency rates.  Such covenants may for instance be on gearing (debt/equity) or on tangible net worth.  If the company has such covenants and not a clear margin on breeching them, it may be necessary to limit or indeed immunize the negative impact from currency movements.

    To look at this issue I will look at a company which has assets in currency and all its debt in NOK, its home or functional currency.  The initial balance sheet looks like this:

    Initial balance sheet
    Initial balance sheet

    Which hedging strategy the company chooses depends on which covenant is most at risk.  There are inherent conflicts between the different hedging strategies, and therefore it is necessary to make a thorough assessment before implementing any such hedging strategy.

    • To immunize gearing from any impact of changes in currency rates the company needs to draw debt in currency in the same mix as the currency mix of assets, including assets in the home currency, NOK, like this:
    Hedge gearing
    Hedge gearing
    • To protect equity against changes in currency rates the company should draw all debt in foreign currency, corresponding to the mix of currency assets ((If the sum of assets is bigger than the sum of debt, the company may in addition use off balance sheet hedging to reach full hedge.  If debt is bigger than the sum of foreign currency denominated assets, the company only draws currency debt until it matches the assets.  The rest is drawn in NOK)), like so:
    Hedge equity
    Hedge equity

    If the company hedges gearing, the size of the equity will be more at risk, since the company hedges a smaller proportion of its assets in foreign currency.  And in addition, drawing a larger proportion of debt in the home (or functional) currency may imply an increase in economic risk.  Normally a company with foreign assets also has revenue streams in foreign currency, while it by drawing debt in the home currency takes on local cost, thus increasing economic exposure.  Hence, if the company does not have to hedge gearing it should hedge its equity.

    Choice of hedging strategy will have different results:

    Impact on gearing
    Impact on gearing of different hedging strategies
    Impact on equity of different strategies
    Impact on equity of different strategies

    As the graphs show, gearing or equity hedge will have different impact on key figures.  However, no hedge at all (all debt in the home currency) will have the biggest impact both on gearing and equity, or tangible net worth:

    Overview of impact on key ratios
    Overview of impact on key ratios

    If the impact on balance sheet values due to movements in currency rates may result in breach of covenants in loan agreements, the risk should therefore be hedged in a way which limits the impact on the most vulnerable figure, be it gearing or equity.

    Originally written in Norwegian.

  • The probability distribution of the bioethanol crush margin

    The probability distribution of the bioethanol crush margin

    This entry is part 1 of 2 in the series The Bio-ethanol crush margin

    A chain is no stronger than its weakest link.

    Introduction

    Producing bioethanol is a high risk endeavor with adverse price development and crumbling margins.

    In the following we will illustrate some of the risks the bioethanol producer is facing using corn  as feedstock. However, these risks will persist regardless of the feedstock and production process chosen. The elements in the discussion below can therefore be applied to any and all types of bioethanol production:

    1.    What average yield (kg ethanol per kg feedstock) can we expect?  And  what is the shape of the yield distribution?
    2.    What will the future price ratio of feedstock to ethanol be? And what volatility can we expect?

    The crush margin ((The relationship between prices in the cash market is commonly referred to as the Gross Production Margin.))  measures the difference between the sales proceeds of finished bioethanol and its feedstock ((It can also be considered as the productions throughput; the rate at which the system converts raw materials to money. Throughput is net sales less variable cost, generally the cost of the most important raw materials. (see: Throughput Accounting)).

    With current technology, one bushel of corn can be converted into approx. 2.75 gallons of corn and 17 pounds of DDG (distillers’ dried grains). The crush margin (or gross processing margin) is then:

    1. Crush margin = 0.0085 x DDG price + 2.8 x ethanol price – corn price

    Since from 65 % to 75 % of the variable cost in bioethanol production is cost of corn, the crush margin is an important metric especially since the margin in addition shall cover all other expenses like energy, electricity, interest, transportation, labor etc. and – in the long term the facility’s fixed costs.

    The following graph taken from the CME report: Trading the corn for ethanol crush, (CME, 2010) gives the margin development in 2009 and the first months of 2010:

    This graph gives a good picture of the uncertainties that faces the bioethanol producers, and can be a helpful tool when hedging purchases of corn and sale of the products ((The historical chart going back to APR 2005 is available at the CBOT web site)).

    The Crush Spread, Crush Profit Margin and Crush Ratio

    There are a number of other ways to formulate the crush risk (CME, July 11. 2011):

    The CBOT defines the “Crush Spread” as the Estimated Gross Margin per Bushel of Corn. It is calculated as follows:

    2. Crush Spread = (Ethanol price per gallon X 2.8) – Corn price per bushel, or as

    3. Crush Profit margin = Ethanol price – (Corn price/2.8).

    Understanding these relationships is invaluable in trading ethanol stocks ((We will return to this in a later post.)).

    By rearranging the crush spread equation, we can express the spread as its ratio to the product price (simplifying by keeping bi-products like DDG etc. out of the equation):

    4. Crush ratio = Crush spread/Ethanol price = y – p,

    Where: y = EtOH Yield (gal)/ bushel corn and p = Corn price/Ethanol price.

    We will in the following look at the stochastic nature of y and p and thus the uncertainty in forecasting the crush ratio.

    The crush spread and thus the crush ratio is calculated using data from the same period. They therefore give the result of an unhedged operation. Even if the production period is short – two to three days – it will be possible to hedge both the corn and ethanol prices. But to do that in a consistent and effective way we have to look into the inherent volatility in the operations.

    Ethanol yield

    The ethanol yield is usually set to 2.682 gal/bushel corn, assuming 15.5 % humidity. The yield is however a stochastic variable contributing to the uncertainty in the crush ratio forecasts. As only starch in corn can be converted to ethanol we need to know the content of extractable starch in a standard bushel of corn – corrected for normal loss and moisture.  In the following we will lean heavily on the article: “A Statistical Analysis of the Theoretical Yield of Ethanol from Corn Starch”, by Tad W. Patzek (Patzek, 2006) which fits our purpose perfectly. All relevant references can be found in the article.

    The aim of his article was to establish the mean extractable starch in hybrid corn and the mean highest possible yield of ethanol from starch. We however are also interested in the probability distributions for these variables – since no production company will ever experience the mean values (ensembles) and since the average return over time always will be less than the return using ensemble means ((We will return to this in a later post))  (Peters, 2010).

    The purpose of this exercise is after all to establish a model that can be used as support for decision making in regard to investment and hedging in the bioethanol industry over time.

    From (Patzek, 2006) we have that the extractable starch (%) can be described as approx. having a normal distribution with mean 66.18 % and standard deviation of 1.13:

    The nominal grain loss due to dirt etc. can also be described as approx. having a normal distribution with mean 3 % and a standard deviation of 0.7:

    The probability distribution for the theoretical ethanol yield (kg/kg corn) can then be found by Monte Carlo simulation ((See formula #3 in (Patzek, 2006))  as:

    – having an approx. normal distribution with mean 0.364 kg EtHO/kg of dry grain and standard deviation of 0.007. On average we will need 2.75 kg of clean dry grain to produce one kilo or 1.74 liter of ethanol ((With a specific density of 0.787 kg/l)).

    Since we now have a distribution for ethanol yield (y) as kilo of ethanol per kilo of corn we will in the following use price per kilo both for ethanol and corn, adjusting for the moisture (natural logarithm of moisture in %) in corn:

    We can also use this to find the EtHO yield starting with wet corn and using gal/bushel corn as unit (Patzek, 2006):

    giving as theoretical value a mean of 2.64 gal/wet bushel with a standard deviation of 0.05 – which is significantly lower than the “official” figure of 2.8 gal/wet bushel used in the CBOT calculations. More important to us however is the fact that we easily can get yields much lower than expected and thus a real risk of lower earnings than expected. Have in mind that to get a yield above 2.64 gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn all steps in the process must continuously be at or close to their maximum efficiency – which with high probability never will happen.

    Corn and ethanol prices

    Looking at the price developments since 2005 it is obvious that both the corn and ethanol prices have a large variability ($/kg and dry corn):

    The long term trends show a disturbing development with decreasing ethanol price, increasing corn prices  and thus an increasing price ratio:

    “Risk is like fire: If controlled, it will help you; if uncontrolled, it will rise up and destroy you.”

    Theodore Roosevelt

    The unhedged crush ratio

    Since the crush ratio on average is:

    Crush ratio = 0.364 – p, where:
    0.364 = Average EtOH Yield (kg EtHO/kg of dry grain) and
    p = Corn price/Ethanol price

    The price ratio (p) has to be less than 0.364 for the crush ratio in the outset to be positive. As of January 2011 the price ratios has overstepped that threshold and have for the first months of 2011 stayed above that.

    To get a picture of the risk an unhedged bioethanol producer faces only from normal variation in yield and forecasted variation in the price ratio we will make a simple forecast for April 2011 using the historic time series information on trend and seasonal factors:

    The forecasted probability distribution for the April price ratio is given in the frequency graph below:

    This represents the price risk the producer will face. We find that the mean value for the price ratio will be 0.323 with a standard deviation of 0.043. By using this and the distribution for ethanol yield we can by Monte Carlo simulation forecast the April distribution for the crush ratio:

    As we see, will negative values for the crush ratio be well inside the field of possible outcomes:

    The actual value of the average price ratio for April turned out to be 0.376 with a daily maximum of 0.384 and minimum of 0.363. This implies that the April crush ratio with 90 % probability would have been between -0.005 and -0.199, with only the income from DDGs to cover the deficit and all other costs.

    Hedging the crush ratio

    The distribution for the price ratio forecast above clearly points out the necessity of price ratio hedging (Johnson, 1960) and (Stein, 1961).
    The time series chart above shows both a negative trend development and seasonal variations in the price ratio. In the short run there is nothing much to do about the trend development, but in the longer run will probably other feedstock and better processes change the trend development (Shapouri et al., 2002).

    However, what immediately stand out are the possibilities to exploit the seasonal fluctuations in both markets:

    Ideally, raw material is purchased in the months seasonal factors are low and ethanol sold the months seasonal factor are high. In practice, this is not possible, restrictions on manufacturing; warehousing, market presence, liquidity, working capital and costs set limits to the producer’s degrees of freedom (Dalgran, 2009).

    Fortunately, there are a number of tools in both the physical and financial markets available to manage price risks; forwards and futures contracts, options, swaps, cash-forward, and index and basis contracts. All are available for the producers who understand financial hedging instruments and are willing to participate in this market. See: (Duffie, 1989), (Hull, 2003) and (Bjørk, 2009).

    The objective is to change the margin distributions shape (red) from having a large part of its left tail on the negative part of the margin axis to one resembling the green curve below where the negative part have been removed, but most of the upside (right tail) has been preserved, that is to: eliminate negative margins, reduce variability, maintain the upside potential and thus reduce the probability of operating at a net loss:

    Even if the ideal solution does not exist, large number of solutions through combinations of instruments can provide satisfactory results. In principle, it does not matter where these instruments exist, since both the commodity and financial markets are interconnected to each other. From a strategic standpoint, the purpose is to exploit fluctuations in the market to capture opportunities while mitigating unwanted risks (Mallory, et al., 2010).

    Strategic Risk Management

    To manage price risk in commodity markets is a complex topic. There are many strategic, economic and technical factors that must be understood before a hedging program can be implemented.

    Since all the hedging instruments have a cost and since only future outcomes ranges and not exact prices, can be forecasted in the individual markets, costs and effectiveness is uncertain.

    In addition, the degrees of desired protection have to be determined. Are we seeking to ensure only a positive margin, or a positive EBITDA, or a positive EBIT? With what probability and to what cost?

    A systematic risk management process is required to tailor an integrated risk management program for each individual bioethanol plant:

    The choice of instruments will define different strategies that will affect company liquidity and working capital and ultimately company value. Since the effect of each of these strategies will be of stochastic nature it will only be possible to distinguish between them using the concept of stochastic dominance. (selecting strategy)

    Models that can describe the business operations and underlying risk can be a starting point, to such an understanding. Linked to balance simulation they will provide invaluable support to decisions on the scope and timing of hedging programs.

    It is only when the various hedging strategies are simulated through the balance so that the effect on equity value can be considered that the best strategy with respect to costs and security level can be determined – and it is with this that S@R can help.

    References

    Bjørk, T.,(2009). Arbitrage Theory in Continuous Time. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    CME Group., (2010).Trading the corn for ethanol crush,
    http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/agricultural/corn-for-ethanol-crush.html

    CME Group., (July 11. 2011). Ethanol Outlook Report, , http://cmegroup.barchart.com/ethanol/

    Dalgran, R.,A., (2009) Inventory and Transformation Hedging Effectiveness in Corn Crushing. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 34 (1): 154-171.

    Duffie, D., (1989). Futures Markets. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

    Hull, J. (2003). Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives (5th edn). Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

    Johnson, L., L., (1960). The Theory of Hedging and Speculation in Commodity Futures, Review of Economic Studies , XXVII, pp. 139-151.

    Mallory, M., L., Hayes, D., J., & Irwin, S., H. (2010). How Market Efficiency and the Theory of Storage Link Corn and Ethanol Markets. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development Iowa State University Working Paper 10-WP 517.

    Patzek, T., W., (2004). Sustainability of the Corn-Ethanol Biofuel Cycle, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, U.C. Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.

    Patzek, T., W., (2006). A Statistical Analysis of the Theoretical Yield of Ethanol from Corn Starch, Natural Resources Research, Vol. 15, No. 3.

    Peters, O. (2010). Optimal leverage from non-ergodicity. Quantitative Finance, doi:10.1080/14697688.2010.513338.

    Shapouri,H., Duffield,J.,A., & Wang, M., (2002). The Energy Balance of Corn Ethanol: An Update. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of the Chief Economist, Office of Energy Policy and New Uses. Agricultural Economic Report No. 814.

    Stein, J.L. (1961). The Simultaneous Determination of Spot and Futures Prices. American Economic Review, vol. 51, p.p. 1012-1025.

    Footnotes